BullGuess Info
BullGuess is the wild new kid on the blockchain, a fully on-chain prediction beast where sharp minds and bold calls win big. No fluff. No chance. Just pure skill and instant on-chain rewards. BullGuess runs high-speed BTCUSD prediction rounds 24/7 that turn precision into profit. Guess right, get paid. It’s raw. It’s real. It’s decentralized.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner can blacklist addresses
It is possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
PresaleBSC.sol
- The manager or owner can pause/unpause the buying functionality in the contract.
- The manager or owner can change the sale start time before the sale has started.
- The manager can set payment distribution splits with wallets and percentages.
- The manager or owner can change the maximum tokens to buy limit.
- The manager or owner can change the rounds data configuration.
- The manager or owner can change the payment wallet address.
- The manager or owner can set time constant for managing time differences.
- The admin, manager, or owner can increment the current step from backend.
- The manager or owner can set the admin wallet address.
- The manager or owner can change details of the current round step and checkpoint.
- The manager or owner can set time shift functionality on or off.
- The admin, manager, or owner can update the remaining tokens tracker array.
- The manager or owner can set the sanction details and contract.
- The manager can change the manager address.
- The owner can renounce the manager role.
- The manager or owner can update referral details in a single transaction.
- The manager or owner can update referral percentages.
- The manager or owner can update whether referrers must be buyers.
- The manager or owner can determine if initial referees are to be paid.
- The manager or owner can update web3 payment details.
- The manager or owner can add users to blacklisted referral mapping.
- The manager or owner can remove users from blacklisted referral mapping.
- The manager or owner can reset the presale to its initial state with new round configurations.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BullGuess smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BullGuess team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Arbitrary Referrer Blacklisting Power
The blacklistReferrer() function grants unchecked power to owner/manager to blacklist any addresses without validation, justification, or limits. This creates multiple centralization risks including malicious revenue theft (front-running transactions to blacklist referrers and steal commissions), retroactive punishment of successful referrers, competitive manipulation to favor preferred partners, and potential DoS through mass blacklisting. The function lacks critical safeguards such as zero address validation, array size limits, event logging, or protection against blacklisting critical addresses like the owner/manager themselves. There's no due process, appeal mechanism, or transparency requirements, allowing completely arbitrary decisions that can financially harm referrers who have invested time and effort building their networks. The absence of batch size limits enables gas-expensive operations that could impact contract usability.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Double Subtraction Bug in Unsold Tokens Calculation
All three purchase functions contain identical bugs in their unsold token calculations. When a round advances due to time expiry, the calculation unsoldTokens = rounds[0][currentStep] - total - amount incorrectly subtracts the current purchase amount twice. The variable total already includes the current purchase amount (from totalTokensSold += amount), but the code subtracts amount again explicitly. This results in remainingTokensTracker recording artificially low values for unsold tokens across both payment methods.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Missing Input Validation in Administrative Setter Functions
The contract contains numerous administrative setter functions that lack proper input validation, boundary checks, and state consistency verification. Key functions affected include setAdmin() (missing zero address check), setCurrentStep() (no bounds validation for step/checkpoint parameters), setTimeConstant() (no range limits), changeManager() (missing zero address validation), referrerDetails() and updateReferrerPercentage() (no percentage limits allowing values >100%), updateWeb3PaymentDetails() (uncapped percentage values), setSanctions() (no interface validation), and setRemainingTokensArray() (weak array validation). These functions can accept invalid parameters that could corrupt contract state, set impossible configurations, or render the contract unusable. For example, setting referrer percentages above 100% could drain contract funds, setting invalid step values could cause array bounds errors, and setting zero addresses for critical roles could lock administrative functions. The absence of these validations represents a significant administrative risk where operator errors could permanently damage the presale functionality.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended to remove unused code from the contract.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Missing 'require' error message
The require statement lacks a descriptive error message, which makes debugging and user experience poor when the transaction fails.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.