BUIDL Info
Buidl is transforming DeFi with the Buidl Autostaking Protocol (BAP) that delivers the industry's sustainable fixed APY, rebasing rewards every 60 minutes, and a simple buy-hold-earn system that grows your portfolio in your wallet, fast.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner can set high fees
Contract owner is able to set fees above 25%. Very high fees can also prevent token transfer.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can start the rebase.
- The owner can exclude wallets from fees.
- The owner can update the liquidity pair.
- The owner can clear the stuck balance.
- The owner can update the fee wallet addresses.
- The owner can update the swap threshold amount to any arbitrary value, excluding zero.
- The owner can update the cooldown period to not more than 1 day.
The contract contains the functionality in which the wallet-to-wallet transfer fee is set to 95% and cannot be changed in the contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BUIDL Token smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BUIDL team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 5 findings
Acknowledged
#1 medium Issue
Liquidity is added to externally owned address.
The contract's liquidity is automatically added to the 'liquidityWallet' address, which is not recommended because, in an extreme scenario, this can be used to drain liquidity from the contract.
Resolved
#2 medium Issue
Missing 'require' check. (Potential honeypot)
The owner can set any arbitrary address to the riskFreeValueWallet, liquidityWallet, and insuredFundWallet address, excluding zero address, as this can lead to a potential honeypot if the owner has set the address to a contract address that cannot receive ETH. It is recommended that the address cannot be set to a contract address that cannot receive ETH to avoid these circumstances.
Acknowledged
#3 medium Issue
Incorrect Handling of Reserves
The manualSkim function incorrectly assumes that a liquidity pool’s token balance should never exceed its reserves (getReserves()). However, Uniswap-style AMMs update reserves only during swaps, causing discrepancies when tokens are manually sent to the pool, rebased, or affected by buybacks. This results in balanceOf(liquidityPairs[i]) being higher than expected, potentially leading to unintended token burns. The function should verify if the excess is truly unaccounted for before burning. A fix involves checking actual liquidity mechanics and ensuring the contract has sufficient balance before transferring tokens, preventing unnecessary burns and maintaining accurate liquidity pool reserves.
Resolved
#4 medium Issue
Missing access control.
The manualSkim function lacks access control, allowing anyone to call it and force token burns from liquidity pools. This can lead to liquidity imbalances, unintended burns, and price manipulation risks. Attackers could repeatedly trigger it, wasting gas and destabilizing the market. To prevent this, access should be restricted to the contract owner or an authorized role using onlyOwner or onlyRole(SKIM_MANAGER). This ensures that only trusted entities can manage liquidity adjustments, protecting the token’s ecosystem from exploitation while maintaining a balanced and secure liquidity pool. Adding access control safeguards liquidity and prevents unnecessary token destruction.
Acknowledged
#5 medium Issue
The fees is set to more than 25%.
A fixed 95% liquidity fee makes token transfers nearly impossible, effectively locking user funds and restricting trading. This creates severe risks, including liquidity traps, unusability, and fairness concerns. If the fee is adjustable, it should be capped at 25% to maintain functionality. If fixed, it should be lowered before deployment to 1-5% max. To fix this, implement a fee cap or allow only reasonable adjustments. A 95% fee discourages trading and breaks token economics. Redeploying with a lower, adjustable fee ensures a fair, secure, and usable token ecosystem
low Issues | 3 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Remove safemath library
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Resolved
#2 low Issue
Missing Visibility
It is recommended that 'public,' 'private,' or 'internal' visibility be added during the declaration or initialization of a state variable or a mapping in the contract.
Resolved
#3 low Issue
Missing emit
It is recommended that all critical changes be emitted.