Team and KYC Verification
The team has securely submitted their personal information to SolidProof.io for verification.
In the event of any fraudulent activities, this information will be promptly reported to the relevant authorities to ensure accountability and compliance.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the buy and sell fees to not more than 20%.
- The owner can exclude wallets from fees.
- The owner can exclude wallets from the maximum transaction amount.
- The owner can enable trade only once.
- The owner can update the automated market maker pair address.
- The owner can update the minimum swap amount.
- The owner can update the marketing wallet address.
- The owner can withdraw the stuck tokens and ETH from the contract, including the contract's tokens.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BrowsrAI smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BrowsrAI team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'require' check. (Potential honeypot)
The owner can set any arbitrary amount to the marketing wallet, excluding zero address as this can lead to a potential honeypot if the owner has set the address to a contract address that cannot receive ETH. It is recommended that the address cannot be set to a contract address that cannot receive ETH to avoid these circumstances.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Owner Can Halt Fee Distribution by Draining Contract Tokens
The withdrawStuckToken function. It allows the contract owner to withdraw any ERC20 token held by the contract, including its own BrowsrAi tokens. The contract is designed to collect these BrowsrAi tokens from transaction fees and automatically swap them for ETH once a certain balance (swapTokensAtAmount) is reached. This ETH is then forwarded to the marketing wallet. An owner could exploit the withdrawStuckToken function to drain these collected fee tokens, ensuring the balance never reaches the threshold required to trigger the swap. This would permanently disable the automated fee and marketing distribution mechanism.
low Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Local variables shadowing (shadowing-local)
Rename the local variables that shadow another component.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
Emit all the critical parameter changes.
Pending
#3 low Issue
Incomplete Max Transaction Limit Feature
The BrowsrAI.sol contract contains a state variable _isExcludedMaxTransactionAmount and a function setExcludedFromMaxTransaction. These are intended to create a system for exempting certain accounts from a maximum transaction limit. However, the contract lacks the actual enforcement logic within the _transfer function to check or apply this limit. As a result, this functionality is currently non-operational and serves no purpose, despite being present in the code.