BNBets Info
The world's first decentralized prediction market platform powered by BNB Chain. Create markets, place bets, and earn from your insights.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can create a new prediction market.
- The market resolver can resolve a market by setting the outcome.
- The owner can update the market resolver address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BNBets smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BNBets team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Single marketResolver Role Creates a Central Point of Failure and Trust
The contract's design creates a significant centralized risk by granting the marketResolver address the sole and unchecked authority to determine the outcome of any market. There is no on-chain mechanism, such as an oracle or a dispute process, to verify that the outcome reported by the resolver is truthful and reflects the real-world event. This allows a malicious or compromised resolver to directly manipulate market results for personal gain. They can observe which betting pool has more funds, place a bet on the opposing side, and then declare their side the winner, effectively stealing the larger pool of funds from legitimate users who made correct predictions.
informational Issues | 4 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Direct ERC20 transfer Call without SafeERC20 Wrapper
The buyShares function directly calls the transfer function on the WBNB token contract and relies on its boolean return value. While the official WBNB contract is compliant with the ERC20 standard, not all ERC20 tokens are. Some tokens do not return a boolean value on success, which would cause the require statement to fail and revert the transaction. This direct call pattern is not robust and can lead to unexpected failures if the contract were ever to interact with a different or non-standard token.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Lack of Transaction Deadline Parameter for User Protection
The buyShares function does not include a deadline parameter to protect users against long-pending transactions. A user might submit a transaction with a low gas fee, causing it to remain pending in the mempool for an extended period. During this delay, the real-world conditions relevant to the bet could change significantly. When the transaction is finally executed, the user's bet is placed under market conditions they did not intend, potentially leading to a financial loss for them. While this is not a vulnerability in the contract's logic, it is a deviation from DeFi best practices that exposes users to risks from network congestion and delayed execution.
Pending
#4 informational Issue
No Fallback Mechanism for marketResolver Inactivity
The contract architecture designates the marketResolver as the exclusive authority responsible for resolving markets. The claimWinnings function requires a market to be in a resolved state before any funds can be claimed. There is currently no alternative mechanism to resolve a market if the marketResolver becomes permanently inactive due to loss of private keys, incapacitation, or project abandonment. This creates a single point of failure where the inability of the resolver to act would cause all user funds in all unresolved markets to become permanently and irrecoverably locked within the contract.