BLURP Info
Look, let's be real. The crypto world can be a bit…stiff. Everyone's talking about lambos and moon landings, and honestly, it's getting a little boring. We were tired of the same old projects, the same old promises, the same old seriousness. We wanted something fun. Something different. Something… BLURPY. That's how BLURP was born. It wasn't some grand, calculated scheme hatched in a boardroom. It started with a simple idea: What if crypto could be…well, fun? What if we could build a community around laughter, memes, and a shared love of all things weird and wonderful?
TrustNet Score
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner can blacklist addresses
It is possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Token transfer can be locked
Owner can lock user funds with owner functions.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The authorized address can clear stuck tokens.
- The authorized address can exclude the address from fees.
- The owner can set a selling multiplier.
- The owner can enable cool down.
- The authorized address can set the wbnb and the cake address.
- The authorized address can manually create a pair.
- The authorized address can set the router and distributor address.
- The authorized address can set the swap tokens to an amount.
- The authorized address can exempt an address from dividends.
- The owner can enable blacklisting.
- The owner can blacklist wallets.
- The authorized address can exempt an address from fees.
- The authorized address lock holders.
- The authorized address can set the marketing, team fee, and charity fee receiver addresses.
- The authorized address can set the current router address.
- The authorized address can set swap back settings.
- The authorized address can set the liquidity target.
- The authorized address can set distributor criteria.
- The authorized address can set distributor settings.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BLURP smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BLURP team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 5 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Missing 'require' check. (Potential honeypot)
The owner can set any arbitrary amount to the marketing wallet, team wallet, and charity wallet address, excluding zero address as this can lead to a potential honeypot if the owner has set the address to a contract address that cannot receive ETH. It is recommended that the address cannot be set to a contract address that cannot receive ETH to avoid these circumstances.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Liquidity is added to externally owned address.
The contract's liquidity is automatically added to the 'autoLiquidityReceiver' address, which is not recommended because, in an extreme scenario, this can be used to drain liquidity from the contract.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
The owner can lock cool down.
This function allows only the owner to manage the cooldown mechanism. It enables the owner to both activate or deactivate the cooldown and set the duration of the cooldown period for an indefinite period of time, which can lock the user funds in the contract. There must be a check where the cool down functionality should not be locked permanently in the contract.
Pending
#4 medium Issue
Transfer of tokens without enabling trade.
The trading needs to be enabled by the owner in order for regular users to transfer tokens. On the contrary, the owner can authorize addresses manually and those addresses will be able to trade tokens. This functionality can be exploited in the following way, For example, there is a presale and the wallets used for the presale can be authorized by the owner. All the tokens obtained can be consolidated into a final wallet address and facilitate trading and selling of the acquired tokens, the last wallet address can be authorized.
Pending
#5 medium Issue
The owner can blacklist wallets.
The owner can blacklist multiple wallets. It is suggested that there should be a locking period so that the wallet cannot be locked for an indefinite Period of time.
low Issues | 5 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing Events Arithmetic (events-maths).
Emit an event for critical parameter changes.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Remove safemath library.
The compiler version above 0.8.0 has the ability to control arithmetic overflow/underflow. It is recommended to remove the unwanted code in order to avoid high gas fees.
Pending
#3 low Issue
lack of validation check.
In this setDistributionCriteria function there is no validation on the input parameters _minPeriod and _minDistribution. Without checks, an authorized user could inadvertently set these values to unintended numbers, potentially disrupting the distribution mechanism. It's recommended to add validation to ensure these values fall within acceptable ranges (for example, greater than zero or within defined limits) to prevent any undesired behavior.
Pending
#4 low Issue
Missing error message.
It is recommended to add a descriptive error message to your require or revert statements.
Pending
#5 low Issue
Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check).
Check that the address is not zero.