BlueLink Info
BlueLink is a next-generation blockchain ecosystem redefining global finance by bridging traditional banking with decentralized technologies. Purpose-built for compliance, speed, and real-world utility, BlueLink offers a vertically integrated platform that includes a centralized exchange, tokenized stock market, banking infrastructure, and a high-performance Layer 1 blockchain.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
Presale.sol
- The owner can set the sale period.
- The owner can update the sale status.
- The owner can emergency pause the sale.
- The owner can withdraw all raised funds (ETH, USDT, and USDC) from the contract.
- The owner can withdraw any unsold BLT tokens from the contract.
- The owner can transfer ownership to a new address.
- The owner can renounce ownership of the contract, permanently removing all special privileges.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the BlueLink smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the BlueLink team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Resolved
#1 medium Issue
Emergency Pause Can Be Abused to Withdraw Unsold Tokens Prematurely
The withdrawTokens function contains a flawed check that allows the owner to bypass the intended time lock and withdraw unsold tokens before the sale has officially concluded. The function's check, if (saleActive && block.timestamp >= saleStartTime && block.timestamp <= saleEndTime), is meant to prevent withdrawals during an active sale. However, the owner can call the emergencyPause function at any time, which sets the saleActive flag to false. This action invalidates the security check, as the condition becomes false, allowing the withdrawTokens function to be executed. For example, if a sale is scheduled to run for 30 days, and on day 3 the owner is unhappy with the progress, they can call emergencyPause and then immediately call withdrawTokens to retrieve all unsold tokens, effectively ending the sale prematurely and undermining the commitment made to the community about the sale's duration.
low Issues | 1 findings
Acknowledged
#1 low Issue
Fixed and Uniform Vesting Schedule for All Presale Participants.
The _processPurchase function contains hardcoded logic that establishes a non-negotiable vesting schedule for every purchase made through the PreSaleContract. The duration is explicitly set to 180 days and the cliff is set to start, meaning all tokens begin vesting immediately over a 6-month linear period. This is a deliberate design choice that guarantees every presale buyer receives the exact same vesting terms, ensuring fairness and transparency for the public sale.