BitcoinBOB Info
Bitcoin BOB is the original mascot of Bitcoin — a legendary meme figure who famously recognized Bitcoin's potential in a YouTube video dating back to the Satoshi era in 2010. Now, he's making a return on Ethereum (ETH) with a renewed mission: to become the first DeFi educator. His goal is to make blockchain and crypto education clear, engaging, and accessible for everyone, empowering people worldwide to achieve financial freedom.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The ADMIN_ROLE can create a BOB reward pool with a specified staking token.
- The ADMIN_ROLE can create a custom pool with a custom reward token.
- The owner can set the slippage value.
- The owner can set the BNB staking wallet address.
- The owner can update the swap router address.
- The owner can withdraw the tokens from the contract.
- The owner can add or revoke the ADMIN_ROLE.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Bitcoin BOB smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Bitcoin BOB team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Total lines
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Unauthorized Withdrawal of All Contract Funds via emergencyWithdraw Function
Both the emergencyWithdraw (lines 573-575) and recoverStuckTokens (lines 582-589) functions, guarded solely by onlyOwner, present a critical centralization risk. These functions allow the contract owner to arbitrarily withdraw any ERC20 token, including user-staked assets and reward balances, effectively enabling a "rug pull" or complete draining of contract funds. Despite their differing nominal intentions, their broad capabilities render them functionally identical in terms of risk, creating a single point of failure and a significant trust burden on the owner.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Slippage in Cross-Chain Token Conversion during _lzReceive
While the _lzReceive function prevents a complete loss of bridged funds by requiring a non-zero stakingAmount after conversion (line 468), it currently lacks explicit slippage protection when calling _swapTokenToStakingToken at line 467 by passing 0 as _minAmountOut. This design choice introduces an economic risk for users: during periods of high market volatility or low liquidity for the vehicleCoin to pool.stakingToken pair, the cross-chain swap could execute with significant unfavorable slippage. This would result in the user's bridged assets being converted into a substantially smaller stakingAmount than expected, leading to a loss of value without direct protection.
informational Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Broad Token Acceptance in Staking Function and Mitigation Strategy
The stakeToken function currently permits the transfer of any ERC20 token to the contract via safeTransferFrom at line 233. This broad acceptance introduces a critical vulnerability: if users stake unsupported or malicious tokens, their assets could be permanently locked or lost, especially if the subsequent token swap logic at line 240 fails or is exploited. To mitigate this, it is imperative to implement stricter controls.
Pending
#3 informational Issue
Direct Token Transfers and Reentrancy Risk in unstake Function and Mitigation Strategy
The unstake function presents a potential reentrancy vulnerability due to direct token transfers using IERC20(...).safeTransfer() at lines 302 and 306 for both the originalToken and pool.rewardToken. While a nonReentrant modifier is implemented, sophisticated malicious ERC20 tokens could potentially exploit these external calls to re-enter the contract and manipulate its state before the transaction is complete, circumventing basic reentrancy protections.