BitcoinBOB Info
Bitcoin BOB is the original mascot of Bitcoin — a legendary meme figure who famously recognized Bitcoin's potential in a YouTube video dating back to the Satoshi era in 2010. Now, he's making a return on Ethereum (ETH) with a renewed mission: to become the first DeFi educator. His goal is to make blockchain and crypto education clear, engaging, and accessible for everyone, empowering people worldwide to achieve financial freedom.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The ADMIN_ROLE can set the active staking token.
- The owner can manage crucial contract addresses such as bnbStakingContract, ethereumStakingContract, crossChainVehicleCoin, and swapRouter.
- The owner controls reserve management, allowing them to set the minBnbReserve and withdrawExcessBnb.
- The owner has the authority to manage roles, including grantAdminRole and revokeAdminRole.
- Admins can configure trade parameters by setting the slippageTolerance.
- Admins have control over deposit mechanisms through setTokenWhitelist, allowing them to add or remove tokens from the whitelist.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Bitcoin BOB smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Bitcoin BOB team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
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State variables
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Capabilities
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Single Point of Failure via Owner-Controlled Configuration and Withdrawal Functions
Multiple functions within the contract are guarded solely by the onlyOwner modifier, granting the contract owner extensive, unilateral control over critical protocol parameters and funds. This includes: Configuration Functions: setBNBStakingContract (lines 433-436), setCrossChainVehicleCoin (lines 443-450), setSwapRouter (lines 456-459), and setMinBnbReserve (lines 465-468). These functions allow the owner to change fundamental operational addresses and reserve parameters without any checks or delays, posing a significant risk if the owner's key is compromised or if the owner acts maliciously. Withdrawal Functions: withdrawExcessBnb (lines 473-479) and recoverStuckTokens (lines 582-589). The withdrawExcessBnb function allows the owner to withdraw native BNB beyond a minBnbReserve, while recoverStuckTokens permits the owner to withdraw any ERC20 token held by the contract, to any _recipient and _amount. This functionality extends to user-staked assets and reward balances, effectively enabling a "rug pull" or complete draining of contract funds. The combined power of these owner-controlled functions creates a critical single point of failure and a significant trust burden on the owner.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Slippage in Cross-Chain Token Conversion during _lzReceive
The _lzReceive function (lines 505-567), specifically within its handling of messageType == 1 (reward notification, lines 525-542) and messageType == 2 (unstake notification, lines 543-560), calls _swapTokenToStakingToken with _minAmountOut explicitly set to 0 (lines 538 and 556). While a subsequent check ensures stakingAmount > 0, this design choice introduces an economic risk for users: during periods of high market volatility or low liquidity for the crossChainVehicleCoin to currentStakingToken pair, the cross-chain swap could execute with significant unfavorable slippage. This would result in the user's bridged assets being converted into a substantially smaller stakingAmount than anticipated, leading to a loss of value without direct protection.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Broad Token Acceptance in Deposit Functions
The depositAndStakeLocal (lines 185-218) and depositAndBridgeToEthereum (lines 300-334) functions both permit the transfer of any ERC20 token to the contract via safeTransferFrom (lines 196 and 314 respectively). This broad acceptance introduces a critical vulnerability: if users deposit unsupported or malicious tokens, their assets could become permanently locked or lost within the contract, especially if the subsequent token swap logic fails or is exploited. The contract currently lacks explicit upfront validation to restrict initial deposits to only whitelisted or approved tokens.