The Next.js middleware fetches user roles and permissions from the (unauthenticated) `/api/auth/role` endpoint and caches them indefinitely in memory (`rolesCache`). If roles or permissions are updated on the backend, the middleware will continue operating with stale data until a server restart or fetch failure occurs. This could allow users to retain access they should no longer have or prevent them from accessing newly granted resources.

Authorization in `src/middleware.ts` relies on a static mapping in `src/utils/gate.ts` and defaults unmapped `/admin/*` routes to requiring "Access Admin Dashboard". This is brittle; new routes might be added without corresponding entries, leading to incorrect permission enforcement. The check `pathname in gate` might miss dynamic routes if not carefully managed. Relying solely on the `payload.sub.role` numeric ID from the JWT without further backend validation for the specific resource being accessed could be risky.

The `/api/auth/role` endpoint, which is used by the frontend middleware to determine authorization rules, is publicly accessible (`requiresAuth: false`). It returns a complete list of all roles defined in the system along with all permissions associated with each role. This leaks potentially sensitive information about the application's internal access control model to unauthenticated users, aiding attackers in understanding the privilege system.

The Ajv configuration in `backend/utils/ajv.ts` disables strict mode (`strict: "log"`), potentially hiding schema errors or ambiguities. It also uses potentially insecure custom formats for `uri` (mixing relative paths and absolute URIs) and `date` (relying on unreliable `Date.parse`). The `useDefaults: true` setting might also mask incomplete input data issues.

The `/api/auth/otp/login` endpoint lacks specific protection against brute-force attacks. An attacker who has compromised a user's password could repeatedly attempt to guess the 6-digit OTP code by calling this endpoint multiple times within the code's validity window. There is no mechanism to lock the account or slow down attempts after several failures.

The `serveStaticFile` function in `backend/utils/index.ts` reads the entire requested file into memory using `fs.readFileSync` before sending the response. If an attacker can request legitimate but extremely large files, they could cause the server to consume excessive memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service condition.

The withdrawal endpoint (`/api/finance/withdraw/spot`) does not validate the requested `amount` against the currency's allowed decimal precision or minimum/maximum withdrawal limits. Submitting amounts with incorrect precision could lead to calculation errors or failures at the exchange level.

The withdrawal endpoint (`/api/finance/withdraw/spot`) checks the user's wallet balance and calculates the deduction amount *before* starting the database transaction that locks the wallet row and performs the update. Concurrent withdrawal requests for the same user/wallet could potentially both read the balance before either request deducts funds.

The `/api/auth/otp/generate` endpoint, when handling requests for SMS or Email 2FA types, generates a long-lived TOTP secret, generates a single OTP code from it, sends the code via SMS/Email, and then returns the long-lived secret back to the client in the API response. This is incorrect for typical SMS/Email code verification flows.

The `validateSchema` function in `backend/utils/validation.ts` uses a helper `convertBooleanStrings` to automatically convert case-insensitive `"true"` and `"false"` strings to boolean types *before* validating the input against the provided JSON schema. This implicit coercion bypasses strict type checking, allowing string inputs where booleans might be expected according to the schema.

The JWT generation functions in `backend/utils/token.ts` originally included the entire `user` object in the `sub` claim. Although `backend/api/auth/utils.ts` (`returnUserWithTokens`) correctly creates a `publicUser` with only `id` and `roleId` for *some* token generation flows (login/reset), other direct calls to `generateAccessToken`, `generateRefreshToken`, etc., might still embed the full user object if not refactored.

The `SolanaService` in `backend/blockchains/sol.ts` determines if the Solana integration is active by checking for the existence of a file named `sol.bin` within its own directory. This method is unreliable, insecure, and easily manipulated or broken by deployment configurations or file system changes. It does not provide a meaningful security or configuration control.

The spot withdrawal endpoint lacks comprehensive logging of critical operations such as user identification, amounts, addresses, and decision points in the process flow. This impedes auditing, forensic analysis, and detection of suspicious activities or system failures.

The user registration endpoint (`backend/api/auth/register/index.post.ts`) lacks rate limiting. This allows attackers to perform user enumeration by repeatedly attempting to register with different email addresses to see which ones return an 'Email already in use' error. It also enables attackers to potentially flood the system with fake user accounts, leading to resource exhaustion (database bloat, potential email sending costs) and denial of service for legitimate users.

The registration endpoint (`backend/api/auth/register/index.post.ts`) accepts `firstName` and `lastName` parameters but does not appear to perform explicit input sanitization before storing them in the database. If these names are displayed elsewhere in the application without proper output encoding or sanitization, this could lead to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.

The `TonService` in `backend/blockchains/ton.ts` determines if the TON integration is active by checking for the existence of a file named `ton.bin` within its own directory using `fs.readdirSync`. This method is unreliable, insecure, easily manipulated, and duplicates the flawed logic found in `sol.ts` (Finding #30).

The registration endpoint (`backend/api/auth/register/index.post.ts`) accepts `firstName` and `lastName` parameters but does not perform explicit input sanitization before storing them in the database. If these names are displayed elsewhere in the application without proper output encoding or sanitization, this could lead to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.

The `TronService` in `backend/blockchains/tron.ts` determines if the Tron integration is active by checking for the existence of a file named `tron.bin` within its own directory using `readdirSync`. This method is unreliable, insecure, and easily manipulated by simply creating the file in the appropriate directory, potentially enabling unauthorized use of blockchain features.

The file upload endpoint in `backend/api/upload/index.post.ts` determines file type solely based on the MIME type in the base64 data. This approach is vulnerable to MIME type spoofing where an attacker can modify the MIME type string while uploading a malicious file. The endpoint does handle certain file types differently but lacks proper content validation.

The implementation in `backend/api/auth/login/google.post.ts` attempts to verify Google tokens through both `verifyIdToken` and fetching user info with access tokens, but lacks proper error handling and validation. It also doesn't validate critical fields in the ID token such as audience and issuer.

Both the Tron and Monero wallet creation functions in their respective services lack comprehensive exception handling, potentially leading to incomplete wallet creation, data loss, or exposing sensitive information in error messages.

The account deletion confirmation in `auth/delete/index.post.ts` uses a potentially insecure token generation mechanism without proper expiration controls, throttling, or rate limiting on token requests. This could allow attackers to spam deletion requests or use tokens that remain valid for too long.

Several admin endpoints, especially in `admin/system`, expose sensitive environment variable information in error messages when configuration is incomplete. For example, the `checkEnvVariables` function in database endpoints directly names missing environment variables in error messages, which could aid attackers in understanding the system configuration.

The WebSocket state management in `src/stores/trade/ws.ts` doesn't validate the origin of incoming messages. While WebSockets should use the browser's same-origin policy, additional validation would protect against potential message injection if the WebSocket server is compromised or if there are browser security vulnerabilities.

The UI Builder component in `src/components/builder/editor/Editor.tsx` performs unsafe JSON parsing of user-provided template data. If the JSON parsing fails, it defaults to a template, but the try-catch block could be bypassed in certain browser environments, potentially leading to client-side code execution if malicious data is provided.

The ICO extension in `backend/api/ext/ico/utils.ts` allows automatic updating of token phase status based on dates, but lacks explicit authorization checks before modifying phase statuses. The `updatePhaseStatus` function can be called without proper privilege verification, potentially allowing manipulation of ICO phase status through indirect means.

The wallet cron jobs in `backend/utils/crons/wallet.ts` have insufficient error handling, particularly in `processWalletPnl` and `processSpotPendingDeposits`. When errors occur, these functions may fail silently or leave operations in an inconsistent state. The functions also lack proper retry mechanisms for transient failures in external API calls.

The user model in `models/user.ts` has insufficient validation for critical fields like `firstName`, `lastName`, and `avatar`. The validation for names only checks that they contain letters but doesn't properly restrict potentially harmful characters. The avatar validation uses a weak regex that could potentially be bypassed.

The application lacks a centralized environment variable validation mechanism. Various components make assumptions about environment variables being present but only check them at runtime when they're already needed. This could lead to unpredictable behavior or security issues if critical environment variables are missing or improperly configured.

The `generateEmailCode` function (`backend/utils/token.ts`) uses `Math.random()` to generate 6-digit verification codes. `Math.random()` is not cryptographically secure and can be predictable, potentially allowing attackers to guess valid codes more easily than expected.