TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can start farming.
- The owner can set the dev tax fees to not more than 15%.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the AsterMiner smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the AsterMiner team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Incorrect Accounting of Compound Bonus Leads to Treasury Drain
A economic vulnerability exists within the hireMiners function's compounding logic. When a user compounds, their personal miner count is correctly increased based on their earned gold plus their compound bonus (goldsForCompound). However, the global marketGolds variable, which is a key component in calculating the withdrawal price for all users, is only updated based on the original earned gold (goldsUsed), completely ignoring the bonus gold. This creates a permanent discrepancy where new miners are created without a corresponding increase in the market's accounting ledger. The result is an artificially deflated marketGolds value, which systematically inflates the payout price for every user who sells their gold, causing an accelerated and unstoppable drain of the contract's funds.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Permanent Denial of Service via Division-by-Zero in Core Pricing Function
The sellGolds function is vulnerable to a permanent Denial of Service (DoS) attack. When any user with zero claimable "golds" (such as a new user or a legitimate user who has just compounded their rewards) attempts to call the function, it triggers a division-by-zero error within the core calculateTrade pricing formula, causing the transaction to revert. This flaw allows any malicious actor to repeatedly halt the withdrawal process and will also unintentionally block legitimate users. Because the contract logic is immutable, this vulnerability represents a permanent and fundamental flaw that makes the primary function for withdrawing funds unreliable, breaking the economic loop and potentially trapping all user capital in the contract forever.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Missing Non-reentrant check.
The buyGold function contains a critical reentrancy vulnerability that violates the Checks-Effects-Interactions security pattern. The function makes external calls to transfer referral and developer fees (token.transfer) before it fully updates the user's state, specifically before resetting the user's reward timer (lastHireTime) within the hireMiners function call at the end. An attacker can exploit this by using a malicious contract as the referrer. When the attacker's contract receives the referral fee, it can immediately re-enter the AsterMiner contract by calling sellGolds. Because the attacker's reward timer has not yet been reset, the contract will calculate and pay out a massive, illegitimate reward based on a stale timestamp, allowing the attacker to steal funds directly from the treasury.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or dead address.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.