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Artery chain Info

studioartery.com

Artery Chain is a next-generation Layer 1 blockchain built on Avalanche, purpose-built for AI-powered, immersive Web3 gaming. Artery Chain fuses rich storytelling, game-first mechanics, and intelligent AI systems to power a new breed of decentralized game worlds. At the core of Artery Chain lies the $ARTERY token designed to unify gameplay, creation, governance, and rewards across an intelligent, creator-driven ecosystem.

Artery chain Logo
Onboarded date 27/10/2025

TrustNet Score

The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.

77.20
Poor Excellent

Real-Time Threat Detection

Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io, is currently not activated for this project.

This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks. For more information, click here.

Security Assessments

"Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis Symbolic Execution SWC Check Manual Review"
Contract address
0xCa58...4e23
Network
Avalanche - Mainnet
License N/A
Compiler N/A
Type N/A
Language Solidity
Onboard date 2025/10/27
Revision date 2025/10/27

Summary and Final Words

No crucial issues found

The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.

Contract owner cannot mint

It is not possible to mint new tokens.

Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.

It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.

Contract owner cannot set high fees

The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.

Contract cannot be locked

Owner cannot lock any user funds.

Token cannot be burned

There is no burning within the contract without any allowances

Ownership is renounced

The contract does not include owner functions that allow post-deployment modifications.

Contract is not upgradeable

The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.

Scope of Work

This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.

The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:

  1. Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
  2. Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
  3. Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
  4. Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
  5. Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
  6. Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
  7. Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.

A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

Final Words

The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.

Ownership Privileges
  • The owner can add/remove the liquidity pool from the contract.
  • The owner can set the trading rules.
  • The owner can enable/disable trading.
  • The owner can enable/disable trading rules.

Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Artery chain smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Artery chain team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.

Files and details

Functions
public

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State variables
public

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Total lines
of code

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Capabilities
Hover on items

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Findings and Audit result

Critical
High
Medium
2
Low
Optimization
1
Informational
high Issues | 1 findings

Resolved

#1 high Issue
Owner Can Unilaterally Halt All Trading
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L86-92
Description

The enableTrading function gives the owner the absolute power to start and, more critically, stop all trading activity with liquidity pools at any moment. By calling the function with false, the tradingStartTimestamp is reset to zero, causing all subsequent buy or sell transactions to fail. This presents a severe centralization risk, as it can be used to manipulate the market or trap user funds by preventing them from selling their tokens. This functionality creates a single point of failure and undermines the trust and decentralization of the token's ecosystem.

Comments

To properly decentralize control and remove this risk, the enabling of trading should be a permanent, one-way event. The enableTrading function should be modified to ensure that once the tradingStartTimestamp has been set, it cannot be changed or reset to zero. This can be accomplished by adding a require statement that checks if trading has already been enabled, effectively making it a function that can only be successfully executed once. By removing the owner's ability to disable trading, you provide a strong guarantee to the community that the market will remain open and cannot be halted by the unilateral action of a single entity.

medium Issues | 3 findings

Resolved

#1 medium Issue
Trading Can Be Effectively Halted by Owner
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L62-80
Description

The setTradingRules function allows the owner to set the buyCap and sellCap to any value. If a very low number (e.g., 1 wei) is used, it acts as a "soft lock" on the token. Since virtually all transactions are for a value greater than 1 wei, the condition value > buyCap will almost always be true, causing all buy and sell transactions with liquidity pools to be reverted. This can be exploited by a malicious owner to trap user funds or can be set accidentally by an owner who misunderstands how token decimals work.

Comments

To mitigate the risk of the owner effectively halting trading, the contract should be enhanced to enforce a minimum threshold for any transaction limits. A direct solution is to modify the setTradingRules function to require that any non-zero buyCap or sellCap must be greater than or equal to a reasonable minimum, such as 1% of the total token supply, while still allowing a value of zero to disable the cap entirely. For a broader and more comprehensive security guarantee, it is highly recommended that the contract ownership be transferred to a Timelock.

Resolved

#2 medium Issue
Owner can set an arbitrarily long cooldown, effectively limiting users to a single transaction.
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L62-80
Description

The setTradingRules function allows the owner to set the cooldownSeconds to any value. If a very large number is used (e.g., equivalent to months or years), it creates a "soft lock" on user wallets after their first trade. Once a user buys or sells, they will be rate-limited and blocked from making any further transactions with a liquidity pool until the entire cooldown period has expired. This could be used maliciously by the owner to trap investors after they have bought into the token, preventing them from selling.

Comments

To mitigate this centralization risk, the contract should prevent the owner from setting an unreasonably long cooldown period. The setTradingRules function should be modified to include a require statement that enforces a maximum acceptable value for cooldownSeconds, such as one day (86400 seconds), to ensure it can only be used for its intended purpose of preventing high-frequency trading, not for locking user funds. For more robust protection against this and other administrative abuses, the contract's ownership should be transferred to a Timelock contract. This would introduce a mandatory delay for any rule changes, providing transparency and allowing the community to react before excessively restrictive parameters can be enforced.

Resolved

#3 medium Issue
Owner Can Arbitrarily Redefine Trading Venues
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L45-56
Description

The setLiquidityPool function grants the owner the exclusive power to designate which addresses are considered official liquidity pools. Since the contract's trading rules only apply to transactions involving an address on this list, this control can be abused. A malicious owner could effectively disable all trading rules for everyone by removing the legitimate liquidity pool address from the list, allowing whales or bots to trade without limits. Conversely, an owner could add a regular user's address to the list, unfairly subjecting them to restrictive caps and cooldowns. This creates a centralized point of failure where the owner can selectively and instantly alter the fundamental market rules for their own benefit.

Comments

To secure this mechanism, the list of liquidity pools should be made permanent and immutable after the initial setup phase. The setLiquidityPool function should be modified so that it can only be called once, or within a very short, predefined window after the contract is deployed. Once the correct liquidity pool address is set, it should be locked in permanently. For the highest level of trust and decentralization, after the initial configuration is complete, the owner should renounce ownership of the contract.

low Issues | 2 findings

Pending

#1 low Issue
Missing events arithmetic
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L45-56
L62-80
L86-92
L94-96
Description

It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.

Pending

#2 low Issue
Sell transactions that violate the sellCap revert with the wrong error message.
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L192
Description

The _checkTradingRules function contains a bug in its error handling for sell-side transactions. When a user attempts to sell an amount of tokens that exceeds the established sellCap, the function correctly identifies the violation but reverts with an ExceedBuyLimit error instead of the appropriate ExceedSellLimit error. The issue does not lead to a loss of funds but creates a confusing and misleading experience for users and developers. It provides inaccurate feedback for failed transactions, which complicates off-chain interface development and makes debugging more difficult.

Comments

To resolve this issue, the incorrect revert statement should be corrected to call the intended error. The line revert ExceedBuyLimit(_tradingRules[i].sellCap); must be changed to revert ExceedSellLimit(_tradingRules[i].sellCap);. This simple fix will ensure that the contract provides accurate and context-specific reasons for transaction failures, thereby improving its overall clarity, robustness, and usability for both end-users and integrated platforms.

informational Issues | 1 findings

Pending

#1 informational Issue
Floating pragma solidity version.
TokenLimitedLiquidity.sol
L3
Description

Adding the constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.