Ape Express Info
Ape Express represents an innovative protocol to overcome the obstacles project initiators encounter during token launch. This protocol allows creators to instantly launch a token that aligns with their project's specific needs.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the fee receiver wallet address.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the V3locker smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Ape Express team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
DoS Vulnerability via State Poisoning in lock Function
The _lock function contains a critical architectural flaw by violating the industry-standard Checks-Effects-Interactions security pattern. It performs state-modifying actions—most notably updating the tokenToLockId mapping—before it validates the integrity of its inputs. The function only verifies that the provided nftId_ actually contains the specified token_ after all state changes have been made. An attacker can exploit this by calling lock with a legitimate project's token address but providing an unrelated, worthless LP NFT that they own. The transaction will update the contract's state, maliciously associating the project with the worthless NFT, and then revert at the final validation step. While the contract's own state changes are rolled back, the initial safeTransferFrom interaction is not, causing the attacker's worthless NFT to be permanently trapped in the contract and, more critically, creating a permanent Denial of Service that prevents the legitimate project from ever locking its liquidity.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Flaw in gatherClaimAndTokenInfo Causes Irreversible State Change and Loss of Compounding Fees
The gatherClaimAndTokenInfo function is dangerously misdesigned and presents a critical risk to users. Although it appears to be a read-only "information gathering" function because it reverts, it performs a permanent and irreversible state-changing action by calling nftManager.collect. This external call moves accumulated fees out of the active, fee-earning Uniswap V3 liquidity pool and into an internal, non-compounding balance within the Uniswap protocol. The function's subsequent revert does not undo this external state change. This results in a direct financial loss for the user, as their collected fees will no longer generate further revenue. Furthermore, this side effect permanently breaks the function's ability to report on newly accumulated fees, creating a denial-of-service on its own intended purpose after a single use.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Gas Inefficiency due to Redundant External Calls in collect Function
The _collect function makes an unnecessary and gas-intensive external call to the Uniswap V3 nftManager.positions contract upon every execution. The sole purpose of this call is to retrieve the token0 and token1 addresses associated with the liquidity position. This information is static and was already available when the position was initially locked. By failing to store these addresses locally in the LockInfo struct, the contract is forced to repeatedly query for the same static data, incurring needless gas costs for users and introducing an avoidable external dependency into a core protocol function.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Functions that are not used (dead-code)
It is recommended to remove the unused code from the contract.