Ape Express Info
Ape Express represents an innovative protocol to overcome the obstacles project initiators encounter during token launch. This protocol allows creators to instantly launch a token that aligns with their project's specific needs.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
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Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can set the V3 locker contract address.
- The owner can withdraw ETH and tokens from the contract.
- The owner can set the token slippage value.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the LiquidityAdder smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Ape Express team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
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State variables
public
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Total lines
of code
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Capabilities
Hover on items
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Lacks Contract Existence Check
The setV3Locker function does not verify that the provided _v3Locker address has contract code deployed to it. The only validation is a check against the zero address. An owner could set this critical address to a standard wallet address (an EOA). If this occurs, the subsequent call to v3Locker.lock(...) during the liquidity addition process would fail silently. It would not revert the transaction, but the LP NFT would never be transferred to the locker. This results in the newly created and highly valuable liquidity position becoming permanently stuck in the LiquidityAdder contract, failing the primary promise of the protocol—to lock liquidity. The only recourse would be for the owner to manually retrieve the LP NFT using their centralized withdrawToken function, which completely undermines the trustless nature of the system.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Critical Price Manipulation Vulnerability in V2 Fallback Mechanism
The bond function's fallback to a V2 DEX introduces a critical vulnerability to "sandwich" attacks. An attacker can intentionally poison the V3 liquidity pools with trivial amounts of liquidity to force the function to use its V2 fallback logic. The V2 liquidity addition is executed using a globally configured and dangerously permissive slippage setting, which can be as high as 50%. An attacker can exploit this by front-running the bond transaction to manipulate the APECOIN price on the V2 DEX, causing the liquidity to be added at a highly unfavorable rate. The transaction succeeds due to the loose slippage, and the attacker then back-runs it to realize a profit, effectively stealing a significant portion of the project's initial liquidity value.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Price Manipulation Vulnerability via Insecure V2 Liquidity Provision Path
The _addLiquidityV2 function contains a critical vulnerability within a flawed edge-case handler. This handler activates if a V2 pool is detected with a pre-existing APECOIN balance but no project tokens. An attacker can front-run any legitimate launch transaction to create this specific state, forcing the function down this vulnerable path. This logic bypasses the secure Uniswap V2 Router and instead uses the low-level pair.mint() function, which provides no price or slippage protection. This allows the attacker to unilaterally set a malicious and wildly unfavorable initial price for the liquidity pool, leading to a catastrophic loss of value for the project as the attacker can immediately arbitrage this price difference and drain the project's side of the liquidity.
low Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Insufficient Access Control on pancakeV3SwapCallback Function
The pancakeV3SwapCallback function contains an insufficient authentication mechanism that allows it to be successfully invoked by any arbitrary external contract. The current security check relies on decoding a pool address from the data parameter and comparing it to msg.sender. However, since an external caller has full control over the data parameter, they can easily craft a call that passes this check by encoding their own contract's address. While this flaw does not lead to a direct theft of funds, it represents a significant security oversight, as a critical function intended for a specific, sensitive operation is left open and callable by any actor on the network at any time.
optimization Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 optimization Issue
Gas Optimization by Declaring onERC721Received as pure
The onERC721Received function is currently declared as external but does not read from or modify the contract's state in any way. Its sole purpose is to return a constant value, the function selector, to comply with the ERC721 standard. As the function's logic and return value are entirely independent of the contract's state, it is unnecessarily permissive. This represents a missed opportunity for gas optimization and a deviation from Solidity best practices for code clarity.
informational Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Missing events arithmetic
It is recommended to emit all the critical parameter changes.
Pending
#2 informational Issue
Function that are not used (Dead code).
It is recommended to remove the unused code from the contract.