Ape Express Info
Ape Express represents an innovative protocol to overcome the obstacles project initiators encounter during token launch. This protocol allows creators to instantly launch a token that aligns with their project's specific needs.
TrustNet Score
The TrustNet Score evaluates crypto projects based on audit results, security, KYC verification, and social media presence. This score offers a quick, transparent view of a project's credibility, helping users make informed decisions in the Web3 space.
Real-Time Threat Detection
Real-time threat detection, powered by Cyvers.io,
is currently not
activated
for this project.
This advanced feature provides continuous monitoring and instant alerts to safeguard your assets from potential security threats. Real-time detection enhances your project's security by proactively identifying and mitigating risks.
For more information, click here.
Security Assessments
Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is not upgradeable
The contract does not use proxy patterns or other mechanisms to allow future upgrades. Its behavior is locked in its current state.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- There are no ownership privileges in this contract.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the TokenStaking smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited the mentioned contract for the Ape Express team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
Functions
public
/
State variables
public
/
Total lines
of code
/
Capabilities
Hover on items
/
Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 3 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Re-entrancy Vulnerabilities in stake and withdraw Functions
The TokenStaking contract contains critical re-entrancy vulnerabilities in its core stake and withdraw functions, stemming from a consistent failure to adhere to the Checks-Effects-Interactions security pattern. In both functions, the contract performs external token transfers via the _claimReward or safeTransfer calls before it updates the user's principal stake amount (userInfo.amount and totalShares). This creates a dangerous intermediate state where a user's internal balance has not yet been reduced, but an external call has been made. An attacker using a malicious token contract (e.g., ERC777 or a custom token with transfer hooks) can exploit this by re-entering the function after receiving funds but before their balance is updated. This allows the attacker to repeatedly call the withdraw function, draining their principal stake multiple times and stealing funds from the contract's total pool.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Precision Loss Leads to Permanent Burning of Rewards
The depositRewards function is critically vulnerable to an attack that allows for the permanent destruction of reward funds. The function's logic first takes custody of the depositor's tokens and only afterward calculates the reward distribution. This calculation, (received * precision) / totalShares, is susceptible to precision loss via integer division. A malicious actor can use a flash loan to temporarily and massively inflate totalShares, deliberately forcing the result of this division to round down to zero. Because the tokens have already been transferred, they become permanently trapped and unclaimable within the contract, as the dividendsPerShare metric is never updated to account for their existence. This allows an attacker to cheaply and effectively burn any pending reward deposit, constituting a severe denial-of-service attack on the protocol's core incentive mechanism.
Pending
#3 medium Issue
Incompatibility with Fee-on-Transfer Tokens Leads to Contract Insolvency
The TokenStaking contract's accounting model is incompatible with deflationary or fee-on-transfer ERC20 tokens. While the _transferIn function correctly measures the actual amount of tokens received after an input fee is taken, the withdraw function does not account for output fees. It attempts to transfer the user's exact share balance, but a fee is taken from this amount during the transfer. This creates a small but persistent discrepancy where the contract's internal accounting of its liabilities (totalShares) decreases by the full amount, while its actual token balance decreases by a smaller amount.
informational Issues | 1 findings
Pending
#1 informational Issue
Unused Ownable Import
This is not a vulnerability but constitutes dead code. It increases the file size and can be confusing to future developers or auditors, who might spend time looking for ownership controls that do not exist. This indicates that the contract is intended to be fully decentralized and ownerless after deployment, which is a significant (and positive) design choice that should be clearly documented.