AiXuSpeed Info
AIXUSPEED: The G.O.A.T of Memecoins AixuSpeed isn’t just a meme coin, it’s a full-speed cultural movement.
TrustNet Score
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Real-Time Threat Detection
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Summary and Final Words
No crucial issues found
The contract does not contain issues of high or medium criticality. This means that no known vulnerabilities were found in the source code.
Contract owner cannot mint
It is not possible to mint new tokens.
Contract owner cannot blacklist addresses.
It is not possible to lock user funds by blacklisting addresses.
Contract owner cannot set high fees
The fees, if applicable, can be a maximum of 25% or lower. The contract can therefore not be locked. Please take a look in the comment section for more details.
Contract cannot be locked
Owner cannot lock any user funds.
Token cannot be burned
There is no burning within the contract without any allowances
Ownership is not renounced
The owner retains significant control, which could potentially be used to modify key contract parameters.
Contract is upgradeable
The contract uses a proxy pattern or similar mechanism, enabling future upgrades. This can introduce risks if the upgrade mechanism is not securely managed.
Scope of Work
This audit encompasses the evaluation of the files listed below, each verified with a SHA-1 Hash. The team referenced above has provided the necessary files for assessment.
The auditing process consists of the following systematic steps:
- Specification Review: Analyze the provided specifications, source code, and instructions to fully understand the smart contract's size, scope, and functionality.
- Manual Code Examination: Conduct a thorough line-by-line review of the source code to identify potential vulnerabilities and areas for improvement.
- Specification Alignment: Ensure that the code accurately implements the provided specifications and intended functionalities.
- Test Coverage Assessment: Evaluate the extent and effectiveness of test cases in covering the codebase, identifying any gaps in testing.
- Symbolic Execution: Analyze the smart contract to determine how various inputs affect execution paths, identifying potential edge cases and vulnerabilities.
- Best Practices Evaluation: Assess the smart contracts against established industry and academic best practices to enhance efficiency, maintainability, and security.
- Actionable Recommendations: Provide detailed, specific, and actionable steps to secure and optimize the smart contracts.
A file with a different Hash has been intentionally or otherwise modified after the security review. A different Hash may indicate a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.
Final Words
The following provides a concise summary of the audit report, accompanied by insightful comments from the auditor. This overview captures the key findings and observations, offering valuable context and clarity.
Ownership Privileges
- The owner can pause/unpause the presale, preventing or allowing all token purchases.
- The owner can credit unlimited tokens to any address without any validation of price consistency or purchase limits.
- The owner can add or remove payment tokens, controlling which ERC20 tokens are accepted for purchases.
- The owner can change the treasury address at any time, redirecting all future payments to a new address.
- The owner can modify the AIXU token price during active sales.
Note - This Audit report consists of a security analysis of the Aixuspeed smart contract. This analysis did not include functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract’s logic. Moreover, we only audited one token contract for the Aixuspeed team. Other contracts associated with the project were not audited by our team. We recommend investors do their own research before investing.
Files and details
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Findings and Audit result
medium Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 medium Issue
Unprotected Price Updates During Active Sale
The contract allows the owner to update AIXU token prices during an active sale without restrictions. This can lead to front-running opportunities where the owner could observe pending purchase transactions and modify prices before they're executed, potentially causing users to receive fewer tokens than expected. The lack of price change limitations and time locks creates uncertainty for users and could be exploited for unfair advantage. Implement one of these safeguards.
Pending
#2 medium Issue
Missing ‘NonReentrant’ check
In the purchaseWithNativeCoin and purchaseWithToken functions. These external calls occur before _processPurchase updates critical state variables (totalCollectedUSD and user balances). If treasury or payment tokens are malicious contracts, they could reenter during these external calls, potentially manipulating contract state. Import ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable from OpenZeppelin, add it to contract inheritance, initialize with __ReentrancyGuard_init(), and apply nonReentrant modifier to both purchase functions. This prevents recursive calls and eliminates the reentrancy attack vector completely.
low Issues | 2 findings
Pending
#1 low Issue
Missing zero or dead address check.
It is recommended to check that the address cannot be set to zero or a dead address.
Pending
#2 low Issue
Missing 'Iscontract' check.
The function allows setting treasury to any arbitrary address without validating its ability to receive ETH. If treasury is set to a contract address lacking receive() or fallback() functions, all ETH purchases via purchaseWithNativeCoin will fail when TransferHelper.safeTransferETH attempts to send funds. This creates a potential DoS scenario where the presale becomes non-functional for native coin purchases, while token purchases continue working normally. Add validation to test ETH receiving capability: (bool success,) = newTreasury.call{value: 0}(""); require(success, "Treasury cannot receive ETH");. This ensures treasury can accept ETH transfers while allowing both EOA addresses and compatible contract addresses (like multisigs).